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LIABILITY FOR STUDENT-TO-STUDENT SEXUAL
HARASSMENT UNDER TITLE

IX IN LIGHT OF DAVIS V.

MONROE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION
I. INTRODUCTION
Student-to-student sexual harassment is not new to our
public school system. It is a growing concern and has attracted
attention from legal commentators as well as the national media.1 Although peer harassment in public schools is not a recent
phenomenon, cases addressing the issue have only recently appeared. Three circuits in particular have dealt with these cases:
the Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh. Although the Tenth and the
Fifth Circuits have not held educational institutions liable for
peer sexual harassment, 2 the Eleventh Circuit has struggled
with the question. 3
Sexual harassment has been defined as "verbal or physical
conduct of a sexual nature, imposed on the basis of sex, by an
employee or agent of a recipient that denies, limits, provides
different, or conditions the provision of aid, benefits, services or
treatment protected under Title IX." 4 Educational sexual harassment, on the other hand, has been defined by the National Advisory Council on Women's Educational Programs to mean "the
use of authority to emphasize the sexuality or sexual identity of
the student in a manner which prevents or impairs the student's

1. See, e.g., NAN STEIN ET AL., SECRETS IN PUBLIC: SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN OUR
SCHOOLS 2 (1993)(cosponsored by NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund and
Wellesley College for Research on Women); Karen M. Davis, Reading, Writing, and
Sexual Harassment: Finding a Constitutional Remedy When Schools Fail to Address Peer
Abuse, 69 IND. L.J. 1123 (1994); Edward S. Cheng, Boys Being Boys and Girls Being
Girls-Student-To-Student Sexual Harassment From the Courtroom to the Classroom,
7 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 263 (1997); Phil Donahue: Six-Year-Olds Sexually Harassing
(NBC television broadcast, Jan. 5, 1994) (transcript No. 3897).
2. See Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1996); Rowinsky v. Bryan
Independent Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 165 (1996).
3. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186 (11th Cir. 1996) rev'd
en bane, 120 F.3d 1390 (11th Cir. 1997), partial cert., 67 U.S.L.W. 3187 (U.S. Sept. 29,
1998) (No. 97-843).
4. 29 C.F.R. § 106.2 (1995).
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full enjoyment of education[al] benefits, climate, or opportunities."5
Until the 1992 Supreme Court decision in Franklin u.
Gwinnet County Public School, 6 the only remedy available
against an educational establishment for a sex discrimination
claim under Title IX was the denial of federal funding to the
institution. 7 Because of this limitation, most suits brought before Franklin under Title IX were by women seeking equality in
athletic and vocational programs. 8 In Franklin, the Court held
educational institutions liable to students for monetary damages
under Title IX for intentional teacher-to-student sexual harassment. This decision, while providing a remedy for teacher-tostudent sexual harassment, did not directly address the issue of
student-to-student sexual harassment.
Claims of hostile learning environments caused by peer sexual harassment are beginning to multiply, but the courts have
not yet fully addressed student-to-student sexual harassment.
In response, some states have passed laws requiring schools to
distribute anti-sexual-harassment policies to students. 9 Unless
the Supreme Court reverses the Eleventh Circuit, however, the
Title IX road to holding educational institutions liable for peer
sexual harassment seems to be closed. 10 All the cases which
have reached the courts of appeal arguing institutional liability
for peer sexual harassment have held that Title IX does not
provide a basis for this type of suit. 11

5. Jill Suzanne Miller, Title VI and Title VII: Happy Together as a Resolution
to Title IX Peer Sexual Harassment Claims, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 699, 707 (1995) (citing
Massachusetts Bd. of Educ., WHO'S HURT AND WHO'S LIABLE: SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN
MAsSACHUSE'ITS SCHOOLS 9 (1986) (curriculum and guide for school personnel, quoting
the Advisory Council on Women's Educational Program's definition of sexual
harassment in education)).
6. 503 u.s. 60 (1992).
7. 20 u.s.c. §§ 1681-1688 (1980).
8. See, e.g., Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979); Yellow Springs
Exempted Village Sch. Dist. v. Ohio High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 647 F.2d 651 (6th Cir.
1981); O'Connor v. Bd. of Educ., 645 F.2d 578 (7th Cir. 1981); Bednar v. Nebraska Sch.
Activities Ass'n, 531 F.2d 922 (8th Cir. 1976); Canterino v. Barber, 564 F. Supp. 711
(W.D. Ky. 1983).
9. See Cal. Educ. Code § 212.6 (West 1994); Minn. Stat. § 127.46 (1994).
10. See supra note 3.
11. See, e.g., Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006 (5'h Cir. 1996),
cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 165 (1996); Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226 (lO'h Cir. 1996);
Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186 (ll'h Cir. 1997).
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This article will analyze the various federal decisions culminating in Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education and will
then discuss why these courts are correct in finding that schools
are not liable for student-to-student sexual harassment. Part II
outlines the statutes that are relevant to this type of liability:
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964/2 Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 13 and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. 14 Part III shows the evolution of sexual harassment in
the field of education. Part IV then discusses the line of cases
that has led to the Eleventh Circuit's most recent decision in
Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education 15 and similar holdings such as Rowinsky v. Bryan Independent School District. 16
Part V argues that Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education
and similar cases have reached the right result under Title IX as
it presently stands then offers some other alternatives to holding educational institutions liable for student-to-student sexual
harassment.
II. RELEVANT STATUTES
A. TITLEVI

Title VI was enacted by Congress "to make sure that funds of
the United States are not used to support racial discrimination."17 Congress enacted Title VI under the Spending Clause of
the Constitution/ 8 which does not allow direct regulation of the
program. 19 Rather, the remedy for a violation under the statute

12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000n (1988). Title VI reads in relevant part: "No person
in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d
(1994).
13. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-88 (1988). Title IX provides in relevant part: "No person in
the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subject to discrimination under any education program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . . " 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1988). A
"program or activity" includes "all of the operations of . . . a local educational
agency ... or other school system." 20 U.S.C. § 1687.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1988).
15. 120 F.3d 1390 (ll'h Cir. 1997).
16. 80 F.3d 1006 (5'" Cir. 1996).
17. 110 CONG. REC. 7062 (1964)(statement of Sen. Pastore).
18. U.S. CONST. art. I § 8.
19. See Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 420-21 (1970).
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is withholding federal funding. 20 In Title IX, which was patterned after Title VI, Congress replaced the words "race, color,
or national origin" with "sex" to give sexual discrimination the
same protection. 21

B. TITLEVII
Sexual harassment was first addressed by laws seeking to
eliminate the problem in the work place. In this context, there
are two categories of harassment: quid pro quo and hostile environment harassment. 22 Quid pro quo harassment is an offer of a
job-related benefit such as a raise or promotion in exchange for
sexual favors. 23 As may be inferred from the context of this type
ofharassment, an uneven power relationship exists between the
person harassing and the person being harassed. This type of
harassment corresponds directly with teacher-to-student harassment, and the Supreme Court in Franklin has ruled that educational institutions are liable in monetary damages for quid pro
quo of sexual harassment. 24
The Supreme Court has also recognized hostile environment
harassment. 25 Hostile environment harassment is concerned
with an abusive atmosphere, most often created by employees
with similar standing in the workplace. The Supreme Court, as
of the 1998-1999 term, still had declined to decide whether Title
IX provided a remedy for student-to-student harassment. 26 For
now, the question of hostile environment harassment remains
unsettled.
C. TITLE IX
Like Title VI, Title IX was passed under the Spending
Clause ofthe Constitution. 27 The purpose of Title IX was to prevent sexual discrimination in federally funded programs by

20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See Meritor Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
23. See id. at 65-66.
24. 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
25. See id. at 73. The Court reasoned that several circuits' decisions and the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission guidelines supported the conclusion that
Title VII coverage was not limited to just the economic aspects of employment.
26. See Rowinsky v. Bryan Ind. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006 (5'h Cir.), cert. denied,
117 S.Ct. 165 (1996); supra note 3.
27. U.S. CONST. art. I § 8.
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withholding federal funding 28-an idea lifted from Title VJ.2 9
Title IX was intended to close a loophole in federal legislation
that allowed educational institutions (mainly colleges and universities) to discriminate against female students and faculty. 30
The Eleventh Circuit panel that reheard Davis, en bane, looked
to a Title VII case, Meritor Savings Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 31 to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Title IX.
The panel determined that a plaintiff must show the following:
( 1) that she is a member of a protected group; (2) that she was
subject to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) that the harassment was based on sex; (4) that the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter the conditions of her
education and create an abusive educational environment; and
(5) that some basis for institutional liability has been established.32

These requirements are borrowed to a large degree from Title
VII principles. 33
III. THE EVOLUTION OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT
LIABILITY UNDER TITLE IX
In Cannon v. University of Chicago, 34 one of the Supreme
Court's first evaluations of sexual harassment under Title IX,
the Court implied a private right of action for sexual harassment claims. The Court in Cannon noted that denying financial
support to institutions that discriminate, although a severe
remedy, did not go far enough to protect the individual. In order
to accomplish Title IX's objectives, the Court borrowed case law
from Title VI. 35

28. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979).
29. 117 CONG. REC. 39, 252 (1971) (statement by Sen. Bayh, sponsor of the billl
("This is identical language, specifically taken from Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act.").
30. See Davis, 74 F.3d at 1193. Senator Bayh commented that this legislation
"closes loopholes in existing legislation relating to general education programs." 118
CONG. REC. 5803 (1972).
31. 477 u.s. 57 (1986).
32. Davis, 74 F.3d at 1194.
33. !d. at 1190.
34. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
35. See id. at 717.
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A. QUID PRO QUO HARASSMENT CLAIMS
In Alexander v. Yale University, 36 the Federal District Court
of Conneticut was the first federal court to recognize a sexual
harassment claim under Title IX. 37 But this court only recognized a certain kind of sexual harassment claim: quid pro quo.
In Alexander, former students sought an order requiring Yale
University to implement a grievance procedure to deal with
claims of sexual harassment. 38 The students alleged that Yale's
lack of a grievance policy interfered with the educational process
and denied them educational opportunities under Title IX. 39 One
female student alleged quid pro quo harassment by a professor
who offered her a high grade in exchange for sexual favors.
When she refused, she received a low grade. 40 Other plaintiffs
brought hostile environment claims.
The Alexander court held that the hostile environment
claims neither denied the participation in nor the benefits of a
federally funded program or activity. 41 The court, however, did
recognize quid pro quo harassment, stating that "it is perfectly
reasonable to maintain that academic advancement conditioned
upon submission to sexual demands constitutes sex discrimination in education."42 Despite recognizing quid pro quo sexual
harassment, the court dismissed the suit because the plaintiff
failed to prove that the harassment actually occurred. 43 On appeal, the Second Circuit, while affirming the dismissal, also
recognized a Title IX claim for quid pro quo harassment. 44
B. HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT CLAIMS
Not until Moire v. Temple University School of Medicine did a
federal court recognize a hostile environment claim as harassment.45 In Moire, a medical student alleged that her supervisor
had created an environment of sexual harassment and discrimi-

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

42.
43.
44.
45.

459 F. Supp. 1 (D. Conn. 1977), aff'd, 631 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1980).
See id. at 3-4, 7.
See id. at 2.
See id.
See id. at 3-4.
See id.
See id. at 4.
ld.
See Alexander, 631 F.2d at 185.
613 F. Supp. 1360 (E.D. Pa. 1985), a{{'d, 800 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986).
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nation, which resulted in her failing her third year of school. 46
The court found that the guidelines adopted under Title VII for
the employment setting were applicable to similar situations
between a student and a teacher under Title IX. 47 However, the
court held that the plaintiff had failed to prove that the alleged
behavior had created a hostile environment. 48
After recognizing a hostile environment claim, courts began
defining the standard to be used in employment cases. Although
the First Circuit in Lipsett u. University of Puerto Rico 49 held
that Title IX prohibits hostile environment sexual harassment
in an educational setting, the holding was limited by the facts to
employment-related claims under Title IX. 50 The plaintiff in
Lipsett was a female medical resident who was both an employee and a student at the university. 51 She alleged that while
she was a resident at the university hospital her supervisors
and co-residents sexually harassed her and that she was ultimately expelled from school because of her sex. 52 Borrowing
standards from the Meritor53 case, the First Circuit held that an
educational institution would be liable for hostile environment
sexual harassment perpetrated by a supervisor upon an employee if an official of the institution knew or should have
known of the harassment, unless it can be shown that appropriate steps were taken to stop it. 54
The next step in the evolution of hostile environment harassment law was taken by the Supreme Court in Franklin u.
Gwinett County Public Schools. 55 In this case a high school student alleged that a teacher had "engaged her in sexually oriented conversations ... , forcibly kissed her ... [and] subjected
her to coercive intercourse."56 Although school officials were
aware of and had investigated the allegations, they failed to
take any action to remedy the situation. 57 The lower courts de46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

See id. at 1365-66.
See id. at 1366-70.
See id.
864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988).
See id. at 897.
I d.
See id. at 884.
477 U.S. 57 (1986).
See id. at 901.
503 U.S. 60 (1992).
Id. at 63.
See id. at 63-64.
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nied the plaintiff monetary damages. 58 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that monetary damages were available for intentional violations of Title IX where a hostile sexual environment
was created by a teacher and allowed to continue. 59
Doe v. Petaluma City School District60 represents the last
step in the federal court system's expansion of Title IX. For the
first time the Court recognized a claim for student-to-student
sexual harassment, 61 but held that in order to obtain monetary
damages, the plaintiff had to demonstrate that an employee of
the educational institution intentionally discriminated based on
sex. 62 The plaintiff averred that she had been sexually harassed
throughout the seventh and eighth grade and that school officials were aware of the harassment but did not take appropriate
action to prevent it. 63 The Petaluma court looked to the Franklin
decision and concluded that although Franklin involved teacherto-student sexual harassment, the Court had implied that hostile environment was generally applicable to Title IX. 64 They
reasoned that because Title VII recognized employee-to-employee sexual harassment, a student-to-student sexual harassment claim could also be implied under Title IX. 65 When the
court considered liability, it noted that the Franklin court required intent and that Title IX was modeled after Title VI,
which also requires a finding of intent ifliability is to attach. 66
In sum, the court reasoned that the "knew or should have
known" test did not apply in the Title IX context and that liability would only affix if the school intentionally discriminated on
the basis of sex. 67

58. See id.
59. See id. at 75-76.
60. 830 F. Supp. 1560 (N.D. Cal. 1993), aff'd, 54 F.3d 1447 (9th Cir. 1995); See
949 F. Supp. 1415 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (different result upon reconsideration).
61. ld. at 1571-73.
62. See id. at 1571.
63. See id. at 1563.
64. See id. at 1575.
65. See id. at 1574-75.
66. See id. at 1574-76.
67. See id.
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IV. VARlO US TESTS PROPOSED BY CIRUIT COURT AND
THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
A. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT: ROWINSKY V. BRYAN INDEPENDENT
SCHOOL DISTRICT

In Rowinsky, a suit was brought by the mother of two middle
school students (Jane and Janet Doe) alleging that the school
district and its officials condoned and caused hostile environment sexual harassment. 68 The complaint alleged that Janet
was sexually harassed at school by one of her peers, and that
both Jane and Janet were sexually harassed by peers while
riding the bus to school. 69 The plaintiffs sought injunctive and
declaratory relief as well as monetary damages and attorney
fees under Title IX. 70 The district court ruled that Rowinsky had
failed to state a claim under Title IX because she did not provide
evidence that sexual harassment was treated less severely toward girls than toward boys. 71
The court of appeals phrased the question before them as,
"whether the recipient of federal education funds can be found
liable for sex discrimination when the perpetrator is a party
other than the grant recipient or its agents." 72 Rowinsky argued
that the word under means in and not by in the Title IX phrase
"[n]o person ... be subjected to discrimination under any educational program or activities ... :m The Court of Appeals rejected
this argument, reasoning that scope and structure, legislative
history, and agency interpretations of the statute all weighed in
favor of not imposing liability for the acts of third parties. 74 The
court went on to state that "[i]mposing liability for the acts of
third parties would be incompatible with the purposes of a
spending condition, because grant recipients have little control
over the multitude of third parties who could conceivably violate
the prohibitions of Title IX."75 Furthermore, the court said that
in the legislative history both supporters and opponents of Title

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1009-10.
See id. at 1010.
See id.
See id.
ld.
ld. at 1011.
See id. at 1012.
Id. at 1013.
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IX focused exclusively on acts by the grant recipients. 76 Finally,
the court asserted that a definition of sexual harassment found
in an Office of Civil Rights Policy Memorandum only addressed
harassment by "employees or agents of the recipient" and, therefore, did not cover acts by peers. 77
B. THE TENTH CIRCUIT: SEAMONS V. SNOW
The Seamons case stands out because it involved a male
student who was involved in a high school football hazing incident.78 Brian Seamons alleged that his teammates forcibly
bound him (including his genitals) with tape to a towel rack and
then brought a girl that he had dated into the locker room to see
him. 79 Seamons reported the incident to his coach who, rather
than disciplining the perpetrators, demanded that Seamons
apologize to his teammates for turning them in. When he refused, he was kicked off the team. 80 Despite continued complaints, the school did nothing until the school district finally
canceled a playoff game. The district's action led to more harassment, because some students considered Seamons responsible
for ending the team's season. 81
Seamons did not allege that the original assault was based
on sex. Instead, he alleged that the school's response to the incident was "sexually discriminatory and harassing."82 The district
court dismissed the suit, holding that Seamons had failed to
state a claim for intentional discrimination. 83
When the case came before the Tenth Circuit, the court applied the five part test articulated by the Eleventh Circuit in
Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education. 84 Despite using a
Davis analysis, the court found that Seamons had not alleged
sufficient facts to establish that the harassment was based on
his ·ex. 85 The court reasoned that team loyalty and toughness,
qualities school officials had urged Seamons to adopt in response

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

See id. at 1014.
ld. at 1015.
Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226 (lO'h Cir. 1996).
See id. at 1230.
See id.
See id.
ld.
See id. at 1231.
Id. at 1232 (citing Davis, 74 F.3d at 1194) (before the rehearing en bane).
ld.
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to the harassment, are not uniquely male; girls at the high
school had experienced the same types of hazings, which had
also been ignored. 86 Notwithstanding the application of Title VII
principles to this case, the Tenth Circuit expressed doubt as to
whether a school district could be liable for a student's actions. 87
Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit resolved this case without deciding whether a cause of action exists under Title IX for this alleged harm.
C. THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION INTERPRETS
TITLE IX
In 1996, the Office of Civil Rights for the United States Department of Education issued an interim policy statement and
request for comment on student-to-student sexual harassment. 88
Under this policy, student-to-student "sexual harassment can be
the basis for a Title IX violation if the conduct creates a hostile
environment and the school has notice of the hostile environment but fails to remedy it."89 The Department of Education has
also adopted regulations that are similar to Title IX's language,
prohibiting institutional discrimination. 90 On March 13, 1997,
the Department of Education issued final policy guidelines on
student sexual harassment. 91 According to these guidelines,
schools are liable for failing to eliminate sexually harassing
conduct by another student "that is sufficiently severe, persistent, or pervasive to limit a student's ability to participate in or
benefit from an education program or activity, or to create a
hostile or abusive educational environment."92

86. See id. at 1233.
87. !d. at 1232 n. 7.
88. See Sexual Harassment Guidance: Peer Sexual Harassment; Draft document
Availability and Request for Comments, 61 Fed. Reg. 42,728 (1996).
89. !d.
90. 34 C.F.R. § 106.31(a)(1996). Section 106.31(a) provides in relevant part that,
"no person shall, on the basis of sex ... be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any academic, extracurricular ... or other education program or
activity operated by a recipient which receives or benefits from Federal financial
assistance. n
91. Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by School Employees,
Other Students, or Third Parties, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,034 (1997).
92. !d. at 12,038.
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D. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT: DAVIS v. MONROE COUNTY
BOARD OF EDUCATION.

In Davis, a mother brought an action on behalf of her fifthgrade daughter, LaShonda Davis, alleging student-to-student
sexual harassment under Title IX and section 1983. 93 The plaintiff's complaint for injunctive relief and compensatory damages
alleged that the defendants knew that a male fifth-grade student94 continuously harassed her and that the school failed to
take the appropriate steps to protect her. 95 Davis further alleged
that the defendants' failure to act not only discriminated against
her, but denied her the benefits of a public education. 96 The district court dismissed the Title IX claim, arguing that the fellow
student's behavior was not part of a school program or activity. 97
The district court also dismissed the section 1983 claim against
the defendants. 98
On appeal, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit found that the Davis' due process and
equal protection claims were without merit and refused to discuss them. 99 However, the panel reversed the district court as to
the Title IX hostile environment sexual harassment claim. 100
The Davis court cited the "sweep as broad as its language" test
from United States v. Price 101 and noted that in Franklin the
Eleventh Circuit had not applied a Title VII analysis and had
been overturned. 102 The court also noted the gradual expansion
of liability under Title IX, culminating in Doe v. Petaluma
School District, as well as a letter of findings from the Department of Education's Office of Civil Rights 103 and concluded that
it was appropriate to apply Title VII hostile environment princi-

93. Davis, 74 F.3d at 1188.
94. Prior to the decision in this case, LaShonda's harasser was charged with and
plead guilty to sexual battery. See id. at 1189.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See id. (citing Aurelia D. v. Monroe County Sch. Bd. of Educ., 862 F. Supp.
363, 367 (M.D. Ga. 1994)).
98. ld. at 1188.
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. 456 U.S. 512, 521 (1982).
102. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
103. Letter of Findings by John E. Palomino, Regional Civil Rights Director, Region
IV (July 24, 1992), Docket No. 09-92-6002.
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ples to a Title IX case. 104 Finally, the court concluded that Davis
had alleged sufficient facts to support a prima facie case of sexual harassment and remanded the case to the district court for
further proceedings. 105
In August of 1996, a rehearing en bane was granted, and the
panel's decision was vacated. 106 The court began its analysis by
noting district court cases that had recognized a student-to-student hostile environment cause of action under Title IX. 107 The
court then noted that the courts of appeal had been far less enthusiastic about finding hostile environment liability under
Title IX. 108 It also observed that Davis was seeking an extension
of liability under Title IX. 109 The Eleventh Circuit recognized
that the Supreme Court had not directly addressed the peer
sexual harassment issue, but only allowed a private right of
action under Title IX if there was intentional discrimination by
the school's administration or agentsY 0 Davis, the plaintiff-appellant in this case, did not allege that the school board had
personally participated in the discrimination against her daughter. She alleged only that the board did not adequately respond
to the complaints. 111 Therefore, the court looked at the legislative history of the bill to see if Congress intended to provide for
this type of action under Title IX. 112
In June and July of 1970, under the direction of representative Edith Green, the House Committee on Education and the
House Subcommittee on Education and Labor held hearings on
gender discrimination in federally funded-educational programs.113 The committee's work focused on eliminating gender
discrimination in school admissions and on the employment

104. See Davis, 74 F.3d at 1190-93.
105. See id. at 1195.
106. Davis, 91 F.3d 1418.
107. See Davis, 120 F.3d 1390, 1394-95 (11th Cir. 1997).
108. !d. The court cited Rowinsky, SO F.3d at 1016, where the court ruled that
there was no cause of action under Title IX for peer sexual harassment, and several
other cases that did not hold educational institutions liable but also did not decide
whether a cause of action exists under Title IX. Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 123233 (lO'h Cir. 1996); Murray v. New York Univ. College of Dentistry, 57 F.3d 243, 250
(2d Cir. 1995); Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 54 F.3d 1447, 1452 (9u' Cir. 1994).
109. Davis, 120 F.3d at 1395.
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. See id.
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decisions of school administrators. 114 None of the testimony before the committee concerned student-to-student sexual harassment.115 Although legislation addressing the issue was proposed,
it did not pass. In 1971, the Senate Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare also produced a bill that focused on gender discrimination in school admissions and employment opportunities
for female teachers. 116 Because of irreconcilable differences between the House and Senate versions of the bill, it was referred
to a conference committee. 117 The conference committee produced what is now known as Title IX; it passed both houses and
was signed into law on June 23, 1972. 118 The majority in Davis is
quick to point out that none of the legislative history of Title IX
discusses student-to-student sexual harassment. 119
The court also points out that Title IX was enacted under the
Spending Clause of Article I and argues that the legislative
history of the law "shows that Congress intended Title IX to be a
typical contractual spending-power provision." 120 The court further asserts that the similarities between Title IX and Title VI
indicate that Title IX was enacted pursuant to the Spending
Clause. 121 Title VI was enacted under the Spending Clause and
the language of Title IX is practically identical to that of Title
VI. Finally, the court points out that the Supreme Court has
determined that Title IX was patterned after Title VI. 122
The constitutional source of congressional power is important in Davis because it limits how the law can be enforced. The
court analogizes legislation enacted under the Spending Clause
to a contract between Congress and the recipients of federal
funds. 123 A recipient of federal funds is free to decline a grant or
withdraw from the program if it so chooses. 124 Furthermore, in
order to ensure that participation in the programs is voluntary,
the Supreme Court requires that Congress give potential recipi-

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

See id. at 1396.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1397.
See id.
See id.
!d. at 1398 (internal quotation marks omitted).
!d. at 1398.
See id. at 1399 (citing Cannon, 441 U.S. at 694).
See id.
See id.
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ents unambiguous notice of the conditions they are assuming. 125
By requiring that the conditions attached to the money be unambiguous, the states are allowed to make an informed decision
regarding whether they want to participate in a particular program.
The court quotes one of its recent cases that makes this point
in the context of money offered to school districts: "Congress
must be unambiguous in expressing to school districts the conditions it has attached to the receipt of federal funds." 126 Having
established that the states must be given notice of the strings
that are attached to federal money provided under the Spending
Clause, the court then considered whether the Monroe County
Board of Education (the Board) had received unambiguous notice that they would be liable for failing to stop student-to-student sexual harassment.
On this point, both the appellant (Davis) and the United
States Department of Justice (as amicus curiae) argued that the
Board had clear notice of this type of liability under Title IX. 127
They argued that the Franklin Court suggested that notice is
not a problem in a case where intentional discrimination is alleged.128 Appellant further argued that a school district intentionally discriminates on the basis of sex if it fails to prevent one
student from sexually harassing another. Therefore, Appellant
argued, the Board had sufficient notice under the Spending
Clause. 129
The majority of the Eleventh Circuit disagrees. 130 In the
opinion of the court, the terms of Title IX only give educational
institutions notice that they must prevent their employees from
engaging in intentional gender discrimination. 131 The court
notes that the complaint did not allege any discrimination by an
employee ofthe district and concludes this part of its analysis by
finding that the Board did not have notice that they would be
held liable in this situation. 132

125. See id. (citing Pennhurst v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)).
126. Id. at 1399 (citing Cantutillo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Leija, 101 F.3d 393, 398 (5'h
Cir. 1996), cert denied, -U.S.-, 117 S.Ct. 2434, 138 L. Ed. 2d 195 (1997)).
127. See id.
128. See id. (citing Franklin, 503 U.S. at 74-75).
129. See id. at 1399-1400.
130. See id. at 1400.
131. See id. at 1401.
132. See id.
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Judge Tjoflat argues against liability under Title IX because
of "whipsaw" liability. "Whipsaw" liability entails a school district facing lawsuits from both the alleged harasser and the
alleged victim. 133 In Tjoflat's opinion, the only way for a school to
avoid liability under the appellant's standard would be to isolate
the accused student through suspension or expulsion. 134 Because
a student has a property interest in his or her education,
granted by the state and protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, he or she cannot be deprived of this interest without due
process oflaw. 135 The educational institution is thus faced with a
choice of lawsuits. Tjoflat further argues that faced with this
choice, an administrator would have an economic incentive to
punish the harasser in order to protect the receipt of federal
moneys. This incentive would render the administrator
impermissibly prejudiced. 136
Tjoflat also posits that in addition to the "whipsaw" liability,
an expansion of liability under Title IX would result in extensive
litigation costs. 137 To support this contention, he cites a study
that indicates that 65% of public school students in grades eight
to eleven were victims of student-to-student sexual harassment.138 The expansion ofliability combined with the staggering
statistics of the study, Tjoflat concludes, would materially affect
a school district's decision whether to accept federal funding. 139
The dissent, written by Judge Barkett, insists that the majority's holding would allow school officials to knowingly ignore,
without risk of liability, the most egregious harassment and
discrimination-even if observed directly by a school official. 140
The dissent further avers that the plain meaning of the statute
allows an educational institution to be liable for student-to-student sexual harassment; the identity of the perpetrator is irrelevant.141 In fact, the Department of Education's Office of Civil

See
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See
See
See
138. See
133.
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id.
id. at 1402.
id.
id. at 1403.
id. at 1404.
id. at 1405 (citing AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY WOMEN

EDUCATION FOUNDATION, HOSTILE HALLWAYS:
HARASSMENT IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS 11 (1993)).
139. See id.
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Rights has interpreted Title IX to impose liability for hostile
environment sexual harassment. 142 Furthermore, the mere fact
that student-to-student sexual harassment was not discussed in
the Congressional debates does not mean that it was not encompassed within Congress' broad intent of preventing students
from being subject to discrimination. 143 Accordingly, even
teacher-to-student sexual harassment recognized by the Franklin Court would not be supported by the majority's view of the
legislative history. 144 The dissent counters the majority's notice
of liability argument by arguing that the plain meaning of the
statute was sufficient to give the Board notice of potentialliability.145 Finally, the dissent urges that the court should follow the
lead of other federal courts, which have expanded liability under
Title IX by continuing to adopt principles from Titles VII and VI
to allow hostile-environment sexual harassment under Title
IX.146
V. ANALYSIS: THE MONROE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD NOT BE LIABLE UNDER TITLE IX
A. DAVIS REACHED THE PROPER CONCLUSION

The majority clearly reached the correct decision in the Davis case. The argument that the majority opinion finds most
persuasive is that the Board lacked sufficient notice of liability
for student-to-student sexual harassment. The notice given to
the Board was ambiguous at best. At the time of LaShonda's
alleged harassment, there was no federal case law allowing a
claim for student-to-student sexual harassment. 147 Furthermore,
the Department of Education's interim guidelines on sexual
harassment did not issue until after the harassment allegedly
took place in this case. 148 To date, there have been no circuit

142. See id. at 1412-13 (citing Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of
Student by School Employees, Other Students or Third Parties, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,034,
at 12039-41 (1997)).
143. See id. at 1413.
144. See id. at 1413-14.
145. See id.
146. See id. at 1414-19.
147. Doe was the first federal court case to recognize this type of harassment in
1995. The alleged harassment occurred in 1992-93.
148. See Sexual Harassment Guidance: Peer Sexual Harassment; Draft document
Availability and Request for Comments, 61 Fed. Reg. 42,728 (1996).
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court cases that have extended Title IX liability to student-tostudent sexual harassment. Moreover, the Supreme Court had
declined to decide the issue. 149 Although it could be argued that
the new Department of Education Guidelines give schools notice
of liability for suits of this kind, the argument is moot without
case law to support it. However, the new guidelines and recent
case law severely weaken the lack of notice argument for school
districts faced with this type oflitigation in the future.
There are other reasons that the courts should not extend
liability under Title IX. First, those who advocate holding
schools liable for the acts of third parties seem to start from a
faulty presumption: school officials do not care and will not voluntarily act to alleviate the problem. Generally, however, people
who enter the educational field do so because they care about
the welfare of children.
B. ALTERNATNE SOLUTIONS
There seems to be a mindset in the legal community and
perhaps in the nation as a whole that the only thing that will
motivate action or prevent behavior we want to eradicate is the
fear of litigation and liability. It would be far more productive to
start from the presumption that a vast majority of administrators and teachers want to and will try to solve the problem.
Schools under the present system lack the tools to handle the
problem of sexual harassment. Many of the problems that Judge
Tjoflat raised are real. School administrators face a Hobbesian
choice when dealing with this type of issue: face liability if one
takes action against an accused harasser or face liability if one
does not. If schools are given the tools they need, clear policy
and procedures, and the power to enforce them without the constant specter of litigation hanging over their heads, schools will
be much more effective in combating sexual harassment.
In order to arm school administrations to combat this problem, Congress or the Department of Education should outline a
clear set of procedures for dealing with sexual harassment in
schools. If they follow the procedures, administrators should be
allowed immunity for actions taken within the scope of their
authority, unless the action was an abuse of discretion or mali-

149. See Rowinsky, 80 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, -U.S.- 117 S.Ct. 165
(1996).
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cious in nature. If society wants schools to combat sexual harassment, then schools need to be equipped with the power and
the immunity necessary to take action. This approach, if taken,
will eliminate the extremes at both ends of the spectrum: by
ignoring sexual harassment or overreacting by expelling a
seven-year-old boy for kissing a classmate.
Another weakness of extending Title IX liability to studentto-student sexual harassment is that it does not necessarily
punish the perpetrator of the harassment. Any solution to the
sexual harassment problem in our school has to include some
sort of punishment for the person perpetrating the harassment.
If harassers are not personally affected, there is little hope of
solving the problem. If there are clear procedures to be followed
in response to accusations of sexual harassment combined with
immunity from suit when an administrator takes action against
harassers, harassers will be more likely to receive the punishment they deserve.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article has traced the evolution of Title IX by addressing the statutes that have affected its interpretation of the title:
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964/50 and Title IV of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. 151 It has also discussed the response of
the Office of Civil Rights to the problem as well as the line of
cases leading to the Eleventh Circuit's most recent decision in
Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education 152 and the Fifth Circuit's similar holding in Rowinsky v. Bryan Independent School
District. 153 Finally, this article argues that both the Eleventh
and Fifth Circuits have reached the right result under Title IX
as it presently stands and contends that holding school liable for
student-to-student sexual harassment is not the most effective
means of combating the problem in our schools. The answer is to
give school administrators and faculty the correct tools to solve

150. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000n (1988). Title VI reads in relevant part: "No person
in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d
(1994).
151. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1988).
152. 120 F.3d 1390 (11th Cir. 1997).
153. 80 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir. 1996).
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the problem: clear guidelines and procedures that would allow
the school officials to punish the perpetrators of sexual harassment with the security of greater immunity from liability.

George M. Rowley

